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Testimony of David Fontana 
Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School 
United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary 
Subcommittee on the Constitution 
“Judicial Reliance on Foreign Law” 
Wednesday, December 14, 2011 at 10 a.m. 
2141 Rayburn House Office Building 
 
 Thank you for your very kind invitation to appear before your Subcommittee today 
to testify on this very important issue. 
 I am an Associate Professor of Law at George Washington University Law School, 
where I teach primarily in the areas of constitutional law and comparative constitutional 
law.  I have published articles in scholarly journals as well as in general interest 
publications on the use of foreign law in our federal courts, and these writings form the 
basis for my testimony before you today. Once a year, I convene a discussion group of 
scholars interested in American and comparative constitutional law. 
 There are several concerns I have with the proposed legislation, but in my 
testimony I will focus on what the legislation means for federal courts deciding 
constitutional issues.  Foreign law can be helpful to courts as they decide the issues they 
must decide to resolve constitutional cases, and so using foreign law has been accepted 
across the ideological spectrum and throughout the history of the Supreme Court.  My 
statement is not meant to argue that foreign law is an emerging and controversial part of 
deciding constitutional cases.  Instead, my statement is meant to demonstrate that 
 
considering foreign law has been and largely remains an accepted practice, and this 
legislation could dangerously interfere with that practice by banning it entirely. 
 
I. Preliminary Questions about the Meaning and Breadth of the Statute 
 
 Before I address my concerns about how this legislation would prevent federal 
courts from deciding constitutional issues, I want to address two issues related to the 
meaning (what does the legislation apply to?) and breadth (how far does it extend?) of the 
legislation.  It is important to clarify what I take this legislation to mean before I express 
my apprehensions about it. 
 First, let me address some ambiguities with the legislation.  The legislation prevents 
courts from looking to foreign law “in whole or in part” as a form of “authority.”  Does 
the legislation simply prevent courts from looking to foreign law as a binding legal 
precedent—in other words, does it prevent courts from considering foreign law in the 
same sort of obligatory way courts might treat their own earlier decisions or any decision 
by a higher court? If the legislation simply prevents courts from looking to foreign law as 
a binding legal precedent, it would have very little or no effect.  This is because most 
would agree that courts hardly ever—if ever at all—look to foreign law in that fashion.1  

1 There appears to be broad agreement with this proposition.  During the hearings this Subcommittee held 
on March 25, 2004 about a previous, related resolution, Representative Nadler stated that of the decisions 
by the Supreme Court being discussed in that hearing, “none of these decisions have turned on a foreign 
citation, nor have any been treated as binding.” See Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the 
Interpretation of American Law: Hearing On H.Res. 568, Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, 
House Judiciary Committee, 108th Cong. 44-45 (2004), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/92673.PDF [hereinafter 2004 Hearing].  There have been more Court 
decisions citing foreign law since then, but they are structured similarly to the decisions Representative 
Nadler and others were discussing during that hearing.  One of the witnesses more negative about the use of 
foreign law, Professor Michael Ramsey of the University of San Diego School of Law, made similar 
remarks later in the same hearing.  See id. at 45 (“I think it’s probably correct so far to say that these 
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The legislation would be preventing a practice that does not exist, and I imagine 
Congress wants to target its legislation at a range of practices that do exist. 
 Alternatively, does this legislation prevent federal courts from looking to foreign 
law as any part of their process of deciding constitutional cases? If the legislation is 
meant to prohibit federal courts from looking to foreign law even as persuasive 
authority—as authority that does not bind courts in a formal sense but only affects courts 
in so far as it convinces them2—then the legislation would prevent courts from looking to 
foreign law in important ways.  I will therefore address that understanding of the 
legislation in my statement.   
 A final relevant ambiguity in the legislation relates to its use of the phrase “foreign 
law.” Based on remarks made by those on this Subcommittee in previous, related 
hearings—and the cases that most troubled members of this Subcommittee and have lead 
to proposed resolutions and now legislation—I will assume that “foreign law” is 
referencing the full range of foreign legal materials.  This means that the proposed 
legislation would even prohibit the use of foreign legal experience as this experience is 
utilized in a foreign legal case and in other discussions in foreign countries.  As I will 
highlight below, I think this usage of foreign legal experience is quite common and 
accepted in American federal courts.  Because this usage appears to be what the 
legislation is designed to address, and because this is how foreign law is often utilized, it 
is this usage of foreign law I will address in my remarks. 

citations of foreign authority haven’t had a substantial role in decisions that have been made.”).  Professor 
Ramsey still believed this issue to be an emerging issue, however.  Of course, there is still some 
disagreement about whether or not foreign law is being used in a more binding fashion in these cases.  For 
an illustrative example, see Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 148 (2005). 
2 For my discussion of the use of foreign law as persuasive authority, see David Fontana, Refined 
Comparativism in Foreign Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 557-59 (2001). 
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 Second, because I am focusing exclusively on how this would affect constitutional 
decisions, I will bracket entirely the disruptive effects this legislation could have on 
international business transactions.  The legislation could be read to apply quite broadly 
in ways that would stifle not just federal judicial decisions in the area I will discuss 
(constitutional law) but also in a range of other areas, most notably international business 
transactions.  American companies participating in the global economy often make 
contracts with foreign companies that require American courts to apply foreign law to 
decide a commercial dispute.  The requirement in this legislation that all (including 
commercial) disputes in federal courts be resolved only by looking to American law 
could significantly deter foreign companies from engaging in commercial transactions 
with American companies.  It is for this reason that several pieces of state legislation 
similar to the legislation you have before you today have specified exceptions for 
business transactions.3 
 With these questions about what the statute covers aside, let me turn to the principal 
focus of my remarks: how this legislation threatens to undermine the ability of federal 
courts to decide constitutional cases. 
 
II. Foreign Law Can Be Helpful for Courts Deciding Constitutional Issues 
 
 Foreign law can be an important part of deciding the constitutional issues that 
federal courts must address, and excluding foreign law entirely threatens to exclude legal 
materials that are both helpful and probative in deciding constitutional cases.  There are 

3 See, e.g., S. 97, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011) (“This section shall not apply to a corporation, 
partnership, or other form of business association.”). 
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certain questions courts must answer in deciding constitutional cases—questions that 
liberals and conservatives almost all agree are important questions—that call for the 
kinds of insights that foreign law can provide.  For instance, in deciding whether or not a 
race-conscious governmental program violates the Equal Protection Clause, courts must 
address whether or not these programs are “narrowly tailored measures that further 
compelling governmental measures.”4  In other words, as part of assessing whether or not 
the program was “narrowly tailored,” courts must address whether there are other policy 
alternatives that would pursue the same goals but treat groups more equally.  Foreign law 
can be helpful here: in surveying the practices of not just governments in the United 
States, but governments elsewhere, are there other ways to pursue these goals without 
having to make distinctions based on race?  
 Another part of this question the Court has to answer in these cases is whether race-
conscious programs serve “compelling governmental measures.”  Do these programs 
actually further important goals? Again, this is a factual question that calls for all relevant 
information.  It might be that foreign law shows that race-based programs work very 
poorly, or work very well.  Either way, that answer is relevant to answering the factual 
question of whether or not these programs further important goals.    
 There would be no reason to instruct federal courts as a matter of federal law that 
they cannot consider at all the “percent plans” adopted by states like Texas that guarantee 
the top percentage of graduating classes admissions to certain public institutions.  These 
plans could illustrate other means of achieving what race-conscious plans try to achieve.  
There would be no reason to instruct federal courts as a matter of federal law that they 

4 Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783 (plurality opinion) (citations to other cases 
omitted). 
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cannot consider race-conscious programs in the military.  These plans could show that 
race-conscious plans do or do not achieve the ends they are trying to achieve.   
 Likewise, there would be no reason to instruct federal courts as a matter of federal 
law that they cannot consider foreign law that might answer the questions before these 
courts.  It is not because foreign law is foreign law that makes it relevant in these cases; it 
is because foreign law is directly relevant to the questions everyone agrees courts must 
answer to decide these cases. 
 As Justice Scalia has noted, foreign law can be relevant in this way,5 even though 
this does not mean that foreign law defines the ultimate meaning of the Constitution.6  
Our cherished protections are still the same cherished protections as they always have 
been and hopefully will always be.  Free speech remains First Amendment American free 
speech, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures remains Fourth 
Amendment American freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.  Foreign law 
plays a role not in telling us to protect speech or in protecting us from searches or 
seizures, but instead in answering the discrete questions posed by applying those 
freedoms in specific situations. 
 Indeed, rather than ignoring or merely implementing the commands of the 
Constitution, sometimes the commands of the Constitution seem to call for foreign law.  
The Eighth Amendment, for instance, prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” It has 
long been understood that part of determining what is “unusual” involves examining not 

5 Justice Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote Address to the American 
Society of International Law (Apr. 2, 2004) in 98 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 304, 305, 307 (2004) (“It is 
impossible to say that such materials are never relevant . . . What about modern foreign legal materials? Do 
I ever consider them relevant to constitutional adjudication? . . . . the argument is sometimes made that a 
particular holding will be disastrous . . . I think it entirely proper to point out that other countries have long 
applied the same rule without disastrous consequences.”) 
6 See id. (“It is my view that modern foreign legal materials can never be relevant to an interpretation of—
to the meaning of—the U.S. Constitution.”) (italics omitted). 
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just American punishment practices, but foreign punishment practices.7 Just as we would 
not want to prevent courts from considering the practices of the fifty states or the 
practices over American history, so too we would not want to prevent courts from 
assessing practices around the world to see whether a punishment is truly “unusual.” 
 
III. There Is Broad Support for Using Foreign Law Across the Ideological 
Spectrum and Across History 
 
 Given this role that foreign law can play in helping federal courts decide 
constitutional issues, it should not be surprising that there has been broad support for 
using foreign law in constitutional interpretation.  This broad support transcends 
ideological lines among Justices and others, and is also reflected in the range of cases the 
Supreme Court has decided over its history using foreign law.  The issues raised by this 
practice are important, but we should be cautious about disregarding the wide and long-
standing support for this practice. 
 The current debate about the role of foreign law in constitutional interpretation on 
the Supreme Court seems to assume that only some of the current and recent Justices 
engage with foreign law—perhaps Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy, and 
Sotomayor on the current Court, and before they retired Justices O’Connor and Stevens.8  

7 The Supreme Court case that appeared to influence many of the modern Supreme Court cases using 
foreign law in the Eighth Amendment context was Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (discussing 
practices of “the civilized nations”). 
8 Both sides seem to assume that the use of foreign law is more limited on the Court than is actually the 
case.  At the time of the July 19, 2005 hearing before this Subcommittee about a previous, related 
resolution, all sitting Justices had at one point or another cited foreign law in their opinions. Sarah 
Cleveland testified against the resolution, but noted that “[a]t least seven members of the current Supreme 
Court have embraced the use of foreign authorities.” Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the 
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States: Hearing On H.Res. 97, Before the Subcommittee on 
 
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Justice Scalia is often cited for his speeches and opinions expressing doubts about using 
foreign law.9 
 But Justice Scalia has written off the bench and in his opinions that foreign law can 
be useful.  In a speech in 2004, as mentioned above, he argued that foreign law could be 
relevant in deciding constitutional cases.  As he wrote in Thompson v. Oklahoma,10 “The 
practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining 
whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident, but 
rather . . . occupies a place not merely in our mores but, text permitting, in our 
Constitution as well.”11 Justice Scalia referenced foreign law in Lawrence v. Texas12 to 
argue about the potential consequences of that decision based on a similar Canadian 
experience,13 and has referenced foreign law in many of his other decisions, including 
some since the controversy about the use of foreign law first erupted.14  
 Justice Thomas has also cited foreign law.15 Among past Justices, the late Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist16 and the late Chief Justice Warren Burger17 wrote notable 
opinions citing foreign law.  And this is just a partial list of Justices who have used 

the Constitution, House Judiciary Committee, 109th Cong. 39 (2005), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju22494.000/hju22494_0.HTM.  Professor Cleveland 
was appropriately cautious by using the word “embraced” and “at least.” Whether or not they had 
“embraced” foreign law, though, all nine Justices in the Court at that time had employed it.  Representative 
Feeney stated at those same hearings that there were “three Justices that are remaining fixed on the 
Constitution without reference foreign law.”  See id. at 62.  See also id. at 13 (“Six Supreme Court U.S. 
justices have approvingly been described by Professor—actually Yale Law Dean Harold Koh—as 
transnationalists.”).   
9 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 5, at 307 (stating that “modern foreign legal materials” are “hardly ever” 
relevant) (italics omitted). 
10 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
11 Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
12 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
13 See id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
14 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Schiro v. 
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356 (2004). 
15 See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 906 n.14 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
16 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n. 16, 730, 734 (1997). 
17 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring). 
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foreign law in their opinions.  Indeed, over the history of the Supreme Court, these 
references to foreign law have been frequent.  As Steven Calabresi, one of the founders 
of the Federalist Society, wrote in a recent article: 
The Supreme Court’s practice of citing and relying on foreign law goes back two 
centuries . . . . If precedent and caselaw count for anything in constitutional law, 
then the legitimacy of Supreme Court citation of foreign law is a long settled 
issue.18 
 
The Federalist Papers are replete with references to the constitutional practices of 
several dozen different countries.  Indeed, Federalist 63 states that “[a]n attention to the 
judgment of other nations is important to every government.”19  Chief Justice John 
Marshall cited foreign law in some of his important early constitutional law opinions.  In 
Marbury v. Madison20—the 1803 Supreme Court case taught to so many of us as 
announcing the cherished institution of judicial review—Chief Justice Marshall looked to 
foreign law as part of his decision about whether judicial review was necessary for 
constitutionalism.21 
And at a time when attention has been focused on Court decisions using foreign 
law to reach “liberal” outcomes, it is important to note that foreign law has been used to 
reach outcomes not favored by liberals.  For instance, foreign law was used in Bowers v. 
Hardwick22 to deny a claim that an anti-sodomy law was constitutionally problematic, for 
instance.  Chief Justice Rehnquist cited to foreign law in Planned Parenthood v. Casey23 
in arguing for the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion.24  As Justice Scalia has 

18 Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City On A Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s 
Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (2006). 
19 THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 423 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
20 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 
21 See id. at 163, 177-78. 
22 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
23 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
24 See id. at 945 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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written, there are many ways in which foreign law can lead to more conservative as well 
as more liberal outcomes.25 
The range of those who believe that foreign law can sometimes be helpful was 
reflected in a previous hearing this Subcommittee held on this issue in 2004.  Several 
witnesses called by sponsors of a resolution similar to the current proposed legislation 
supported the occasional use of foreign law.  One witness testified that “foreign law 
could be relevant to prove a fact about the world which is relevant to the law . . . . I 
would thus modify the resolution to make clear that these uses of foreign or international 
law are legitimate.”26 Another witness made a similar point.27 
To be sure, there are those Justices on the court now and before—and those 
commentators writing about the use of foreign law now and before—who might be more 
or less inclined to use foreign law more or less often.  But there are very few Justices or 
other experts who believe that foreign law is always completely irrelevant, as the 
legislation seems to mandate.  
In other words, because this legislation can be read to prohibit any use of foreign 
law, this legislation would be telling the large majority of those working on these issues 
now and over history that they are wrong.  This legislation would be telling John 
Marshall, Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer that their opinions are deciding issues in a 
way that has been prohibited as a matter of federal law.  I would be hesitant to take such 
steps given the widespread and long-standing agreement on this issue. 

25 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
26 See Statement of John O. McGinnis, 2004 Hearing, supra note 1, at 31. 
27 See Statement of Michael D. Ramsey, 2004 Hearing, supra note 1, at 22 (“A . . . category of references to 
foreign materials is more controversial, but, in my view, usually appropriate if done cautiously. These 
references arise when the constitutionality of a U.S. law can be informed by facts existing in a foreign 
country.”). 
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IV. A Brief Response to Concerns about Foreign Law 
 
 I will leave it to the excellent panelists and to the questions that members of the 
Subcommittee might have to address in greater detail the concerns with looking to 
foreign law.  I take the major concerns to be that looking to foreign law is undemocratic 
and unprincipled.  Let me take each point in turn.  
 One criticism of using foreign law is that it is undemocratic—after all, citizens of 
the United States did not vote for foreign judges, so why should their decisions affect our 
American law? Simply put, courts do not decide constitutional cases based solely on 
materials that the American people have voted for or ratified.  The language of the 
Constitution, the original understanding of that language, and information how about 
those understandings work in practice (are they “narrowly tailored,” for instance) are all 
relevant in deciding cases—and none of these have been democratically authorized by the 
American people.   
 Considering foreign law also poses no democratic concerns because considering 
foreign law does not mean adopting foreign law.  Sources can be used negatively, as role 
models of precisely what a court wants to avoid.  This is true of domestic legal sources 
and foreign legal sources.  Just as we do not want another Dred Scott, and courts might 
disavow that decision to help them reach a current decision, so too foreign law has been 
used to highlight a foreign practice that our courts especially want to avoid.28  
 If Americans are troubled by judges considering foreign law, they have the same 
options they have if Americans are troubled by anything else federal judges might do. 

28 For a good example, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650-52 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
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Federal judges deciding any constitutional case are accountable to us because federal 
judges are appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and subject to 
impeachment based on their conduct.  If a judge puts forward a strained interpretation of 
the First Amendment, for instance, the President might decide not to nominate that judge 
for another position, the Senate might refuse to confirm that judge, and/or that judge 
might be impeached and removed from office if his or her conduct is deemed sufficiently 
problematic.  The same is true here: if a judge uses foreign law when it is not needed or 
unwise, he or she can be denied further appointment or confirmation, and/or impeached 
and removed from office if his or her conduct is deemed sufficiently problematic.   
 Another concern is that judges applying foreign law have been and inevitably will 
be unprincipled—how do they know in what cases foreign law is relevant, and in those 
cases what foreign law to examine? These are difficult questions, but judges should 
evaluate the relevance of foreign law in the same fashion as they evaluate the relevance 
of other law.  Judges define the constitutional questions they must answer and look for 
the most relevant law to help them answer those questions.  If a federal court has to 
decide a free speech case, it knows to look for free speech cases.  Likewise, if a federal 
court has to decide an affirmative action case, it can look for foreign jurisdictions that 
have decided cases about affirmative action.  As Justice Breyer has written, our courts 
have “long considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have 
applied standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly 
comparable circumstances.”29  
 Sometimes the task is even less complicated.  In Eighth Amendment cases, to 
determine if a practice is “unusual,” the Court looks to materials from all countries to see 

29 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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if they permit a particular practice.  Rather than having to select more or less relevant 
foreign jurisdictions, all foreign jurisdictions are relevant.30 
 I must freely admit that in practice our federal courts have been too selective in 
considering foreign law, and that this does concern me.  There is no reason why the 
Supreme Court should look at foreign law in some Eighth Amendment cases and not 
others, as has been the case recently.  There is no reason why the Supreme Court should 
look to foreign law in gay rights cases and not in abortion cases, as has been the case 
recently. I do not think the proper response is to prevent the federal courts from looking 
to foreign law entirely, but instead to find ways to have them look to foreign law more 
consistently and more fairly.  Developing a set of best practices will help courts use 
foreign law better, and will help them understand foreign law better.  This is how our 
courts have thrived over several hundred years, and how they have mastered complicated 
issues as these issues have come through the courthouse doors.  Foreign law is no 
different.   
 
Thank you again for the opportunity to address this Subcommittee, and I look 





30 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming 
weight of international opinion.”). 
